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Abstract 
Keizer et al. (2008) explore disorderly settings linked to a process of spreading norm violation. The results show that if 
norm violating behavior becomes more common, it negatively affects compliance in other areas. This comment 
addresses problematic areas in their studies and provides new empirical evidence of a cross-norm inhibition effect that 
deals with such criticism.
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Keizer, Lindenberg and Steg (2008) conduct six interesting field experiments and 
report that their results provide evidence of the broken windows theory. Such an analysis 
is highly relevant as the (broken windows) theory is both controversial and lacking 
empirical support. Keizer et al.’s key aim was to conceptualize a disorderly setting in 
such a way that it is linked to a process of spreading norm violation. The strength of the 
study is the exploration of cross-norm inhibition effects in a controlled field experimental 
environment. Their results show that if norm violating behavior becomes more common, 
it negatively affects compliance in other areas. Nevertheless, this comment paper 
discusses several shortcomings or limitations and provides new empirical evidence that 
deals with these problems.  
 
2. Comments 
Keizer et al. (2008) observe the behavior of individuals in a “low cost” 
environment. The disorder was created through graffiti, a space that was littered, four 
bicycles locked to the fence where it is prohibited to lock bicycles, four unreturned 
shopping carts standing around in disarray, or illegally setting off firecrackers within 
hearing distance. The activities observed were littering, stepping through the gap in a 
fence (prohibited) or stealing an envelope containing 5 euros. However, one wonders 
about potential cross-norm inhibition effects in more serious situations such as cheating 
on taxes, bribing, speeding, or driving under the influence of alcohol where monetary 
incentives to evade a rule or the externalities to others can be seen as more severe. Thus, I 
report empirical evidence not only for throwing away litter in a public place, but also for 
cheating on tax if one has the chance, claiming state benefits to which one is not entitled, 
paying cash for services to avoid taxes, speeding over the limit in built-up areas, driving 
under the influence of alcohol, avoiding a fare on public transport, lying in one’s own 
interest, and accepting a bribe in the course of duties.  
Keizer et al.’s (2008) study assumes that individuals in their daily routine are 
aware of the disorder or order situation that was created. However, this is a strong 
assumption. Routines may allow subjects to get distracted by other things. Thus, even if 
the arrangements in all experiments were such that is was almost impossible for people 
not to notice the violations of such an injunctive norm, researchers were not able to 
directly control individuals’ perceptions. Thus, I show empirical evidence where people 
were directly asked how many of their compatriots are perceived to be non-compliant 
using a scale from 1 (almost none) to 4 (almost all).  
The strength of Keizer et al.’s (2008) field experiments is the handling of the 
causality problem comparing a control group (no disorder) with a treatment group 
(disorder). However, as they only observe and explore individuals’ behavior, their 
analysis is rather descriptive, providing information about raw effects but not partial 
effects. They are not able to control for socio-demographic or socio-economic factors, 
except for gender, however they state “gender was coded at first but turned out not to 
have any impact on the results and was dropped in later experiments” (p. 1683). 
Nevertheless, the empirical literature on rule compliance has clearly shown that socio-
demographic and socio-economic factors matter (see, e.g., Torgler 2007, Tittle 1980, 
Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). Multiple regressions would have been useful to 
disentangle the cross-norm inhibition effects from other potential factors. Furthermore, in 
several of their field experiments, non-compliance was related with deterrence 
(probability of a fine). Thus, one should control for risk attitudes. In addition, empirical 
studies have shown a negative correlation between religiosity and non-compliance (see 
Hull 2000, Hirschi and Stark 1969, Lipford, McCormick and Tollison 1993, Torgler 
2006). I therefore present empirical evidence using a multivariate analysis that controls 
for age, gender, formal education (age of completion), informal education (political 
interest), risk aversion (preference for job safety), marital and employment status, and 
religiosity (frequency of attendance at religious services).  
The N in Keizer et al. (2008) is relatively small (between 44 and 77 observations 
per treatment). It might be large enough to see statistical differences but field experiments 
are now often conducted with a larger sample size. Moreover, the compliance literature 
reports that individuals’ heterogeneity triggers the overall behavior (Slemrod 1992). 
Without controlling for it one may expect noisy data. Thus, I will work with a large 
database containing between 16 000 and 35 000 subjects. Moreover, Keizer et al.’s 
(2008) field experiments were conducted in Groningen. One wonders whether we would 
observe similar effects in other countries and cultures as it has been demonstrated that 
cultural and institutional environments are important for compliance (Torgler and 
Schneider 2007). Thus, I use data from 31 countries, namely: Germany, Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Malta, 
Netherlands, North Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak 
Republic, Turkey, and Ukraine.  
 
3. Data 
I exploit recent data from the European Values Survey (EVS). Interviews are 
face-to-face and those interviewed are adult citizens aged 18 years and older. The average 
response rate is around 60%. As dependent variables I measure individuals’ willingness 
(justifiability) to comply with social norms in nine cases working with a four-point scale 
(0 to 3, 3=never justified). Asking an individual view on rule evasion is different from 
asking a person whether she or he has cheated. The actual cheating decision is affected 
greatly by the probability of being caught which is a function of a country’s law 
enforcement system, not of an individual’s attitudes (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 
2003). Thus, looking at attitudes might be a good way of identifying cross-norm 
inhibition effects. Despite the discussed advantages I am aware of the difficulty in 
interpreting the observed correlations as causal effects. This is a major disadvantage 
compared to Keizer et al.’s (2008) field experiments.  
 
4. Model and Results 
A weighted ordered probit model is used in order to analyze the ranking 
information of the scaled dependent variable and to obtain a reflection of the national 
distribution. In addition, I also cluster the standard errors by up to 500 official local 
regions based on the Eurostat NUTS level 2 classification. Such clustering will pick up 
any regional characteristics that are not controlled in the specification. Similarly, I have 
also added country dummy variables to control for unobserved country differences. The 
results of the 81 (9x9) regressions are summarized in Table 1. In line with Keizer et al. 
(2008) I also observe cross-norm inhibition effects. However, the severity and dimension 
matters. Some norm deviances are more strongly affected by the perceived disorder 
conditions. Strong cross-norm inhibition effects are found for lying, avoiding a fare, 
speeding and cheating on taxes. On the other hand, lower effects are generated through 
perceived driving under alcohol or littering. In general, the strongest effects are found for 
identical or similar norm-deviances.  
In summary, my contention is that the published evidence does support cross-
norm inhibition effects. However, the effects are strongly driven by both the explored 
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Table I: Within-Norm and Cross-Norm Inhibition Effect 
Dependent Variable: 
Justifiability L T GB PC  S DA F LY B 
Key Independent Variable: 
Perceptions about the behavior 
of others          
Littering (L) -0.079*** -0.008 0.001 -0.026* -0.021 -0.018 -0.075*** -0.074*** -0.029** 
 -5.03 -0.63 0.08 -1.94 -1.44 -0.79 -3.66 -5.56 -2.13 
          
Cheating on tax (T) -0.024 -0.243*** -0.053*** -0.197*** -0.125*** -0.086*** -0.131*** -0.137*** -0.117*** 
 -1.32 -14.34 -3.63 -13.93 -7.33 -4.46 -5.75 -8.97 -6.96 
          
Claiming gov. benefit. (GB) -0.012 -0.086*** -0.089*** -0.041*** -0.047*** -0.041** -0.081*** -0.033** -0.074*** 
 -0.58 -6.07 -5.24 -3.21 -2.67 -2.1 -4.3 -2.33 -4.25 
          
Paying  cash to avoid taxes 
(PC) -0.031 -0.144*** -0.020 -0.249*** -0.095*** -0.039** -0.114*** -0.103*** -0.082*** 
 -1.62 -8.64 -1.17 -14.33 -6.05 -2.27 -4.9 -6.4 -4.41 
          
Speeding in built-up areas (S) -0.033* -0.043*** -0.010 -0.062*** -0.200*** -0.058*** -0.094*** -0.079*** -0.015 
 -1.94 -2.91 -0.54 -3.93 -9.95 -2.87 -4.71 -5.18 -0.84 
          
Driving under alcohol (DA) -0.001 -0.002 -0.016 0.017 0.016 -0.108*** -0.023 -0.018 -0.049*** 
 -0.06 -0.1 -0.85 1.13 0.97 -4.95 -1.03 -1.12 -2.84 
          
Avoid a fare (F) -0.110*** -0.073*** -0.059*** -0.053*** -0.079*** -0.113*** -0.266*** -0.088*** -0.105*** 
 -4.38 -3.69 -3.08 -2.24 -3.75 -4.73 -12.92 -4.51 -4.6 
          
Lying (LY) -0.136*** -0.153*** -0.056*** -0.179*** -0.123*** -0.122*** -0.205*** -0.360*** -0.173*** 
 -5.99 -7.45 -3.06 -8.13 -6.98 -5.52 -8.97 -18.14 -8.73 
          
Bribing (B) 0.031 -0.066*** -0.021 -0.051** -0.008 -0.053** -0.050* -0.046* -0.175*** 
 1.11 -3.12 -1.1 -2.46 -0.4 -2.26 -1.92 -1.93 -10.11 
Notes: Summary of 81 regressions. As control variable we used age, gender, formal and informal education, risk aversion, marital status, 
employment status, religiosity, country dummy variables. The table reports coefficient and z-values. The z-values are in italics. Significance levels 
are: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors adjustments through clustering over European regions.  
